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Abstract 
 
This Essay elaborates in three ways the call for a renewal of social science approaches to 
international law advanced by Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton, and Tom Ginsburg. First, while 
we affirm the importance of what they call the “scientific method” of hypothesis testing, we argue 
that it can and must be complemented by several other well-institutionalized social science 
approaches to international law. Second, we loosen the conventional “internal”/“external” 
distinction in legal scholarship and make the case that conceptualization and empirics are integral 
to both approaches. Third, we propose that the full promise of social science approaches to 
international law can only be realized when the international is held in dynamic and temporal 
tension with the national and local. Expanding scholarship on transnational legal orders and 
ordering brings theory and research on international law (including conventional “internal” 
approaches) into productive engagement with growing bodies of socio-legal research and scholarship 
(the so-called “external” view), with mutual benefits for both. The Essay illustrates the promise 
of the transnational legal order framework with two illustrations, one from international trade 
law through the World Trade Organization and the other from international commercial law 
created and promulgated by United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
This Essay responds to the call for a renewal of social science approaches to 
international law advanced by Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton, and Tom Ginsburg.1 
In their framework essay to this symposium, they define “the conventional social 
science approach to law” as “clearly stating a research question, developing 
hypotheses, using a research design to test that hypotheses based on some form 
of qualitative or quantitative data, and presenting conclusions, all while 
acknowledging the assumptions upon which they are based and the level of 
uncertainty associated with those results.”2 They label this form of research an 
“external approach to law,” which they (conventionally) contrast with “internal,” 
“doctrinal” scholarship that is “descriptive” and “normative.”3 They then illustrate 
their argument with empirical studies of international law involving such issues as 
whether Bilateral Investment Treaties lead to increased investment flows between 
the countries that sign them, the effectiveness of international human rights 
agreements, and the efficacy of international dispute resolution.4 
Our Essay elaborates their call for social science in three ways. First, while 
we affirm the importance of what they call the “scientific method” of hypothesis 
testing, we argue that it can and must be complemented by several other well-
institutionalized social science approaches to international law. Second, we 
reconceive the links between internal and external approaches to international law 
by proposing that conceptualization and empirics are integral to both approaches. 
We thus loosen the conventional “internal”/“external” distinction in legal 
scholarship, which is reflected in their essay and in critiques of the empirical 
approach that they advocate. Third, we propose that the full promise of social 
science approaches to international law can only be realized when the international 
is held in dynamic and temporal tension with the national and local, thus also 
permeating the international/national law dichotomy as reflected in 
methodologically nationalist scholarship. Processes of transnational legal ordering 
and the rise and fall of what we conceptualize as “transnational legal orders” 
(TLOs) bring theory and research on international law (including conventional 
“internal” approaches) into productive engagement with growing bodies of socio-
legal research and scholarship (the so-called “external” view), with mutual benefits 
for both. In these ways, our approach can provide a bridge between those 
 
1  Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law and Its 
Applications, 22 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2021). As they note, such empirical study was earlier extensively 
surveyed and assessed in Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Law 
Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
2  Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 5.  
3  Id. 
4  Id. at 16–17, 21.  
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adopting internal (doctrinal) and external (empirical) approaches to international 
law. 
II.  AMPLIFYING “THE SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW”  
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg present a particular version of “social science” 
based on deductive reasoning in which hypotheses are developed and tested. 
There are clear advantages to the deductive approach that they highlight. The 
researcher aims to be objective, posits a hypothesis, gathers data, and lets the data 
speak, either confirming or disproving hypotheses. In the process, this work can 
(and should) inform social decision making. 
While this aspect of social-science engagement with law has many merits and 
is a critical component of a comprehensive project, a review of the extensive 
anthropological,5 sociological,6 political science,7 economic,8 and sociolegal9 
literatures on international law and institutions demonstrates that a multiplicity of 
methods and theories compose the richly textured promise of social science for 
the study and practice of international law. First, the complementarity of other 
empirical approaches is necessary because frequently, the most important 
questions cannot readily be reduced to quantitatively measurable variables. Even 
if they can be, there is an absence of valid and reliable data on cross-sectional or 
time-series studies of states and supranational institutions. Second, this 
complementarity is necessary because the ability to produce a verifiable theory 
relies on prior stages of understanding, concept development, and hypothesis 
production, and likewise depends upon later types of empirical research to make 
meaning of results that all too often are conflicting, ambiguous, or lacking in much 
 
5  See, e.g., GALIT SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF THE 
WORLD BANK (2012); SALLY MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006). 
6  See, e.g., GREGOIRE MALLARD, FALLOUT: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL FRACTURE 
(2014); JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE HAGUE 
TRIBUNALS (2003); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000). 
7  See, e.g., ABRAHAM NEWMAN & HENRY FARRELL, OF PRIVACY AND POWER: THE TRANSATLANTIC 
STRUGGLE OVER FREEDOM AND SECURITY (2019); BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); Emilie Hafner-Burton & James Ron, 
Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes, 61 WORLD POL. 360 (2009). 
8  See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, ECONOMICS RULES: THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE DISMAL SCIENCE 
118, 144 (2015) (stressing that useful economic analysis requires choices among models that involve 
both science and craft). 
9  See, e.g., GREGORY SHAFFER, EMERGING POWERS AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE PAST 
AND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (forthcoming 2021); Alexandra Huneeus, 
Pushing States to Prosecute Atrocity: The Inter-American Court and Positive Complementarity, in THE NEW 
LEGAL REALISM: STUDYING LAW GLOBALLY VOL. II 225, 228–29 (Heinz Klug & Engle Merry eds., 
2016). 
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explanatory power.10 Hypothesis testing therefore is neither the starting point nor 
the ending point of social science work, but rather one important component of 
ways that social science can address law’s relationships with society, politics, and 
the economy. 11 
The embeddedness of hypothesis testing in a wider multi-faceted enterprise 
of social science can be seen in the development of an extensive body of 
interdisciplinary scholarship in the past several years on the normative 
development, rise, contestation, and fall of TLOs.12 This line of research and 
theory arose from an intuitive sense that a new framework was needed to 
understand and address the scope and diversity of social, economic, civil, health, 
environmental, and other problems that engage law across national frontiers, and 
in which international law is a component. The empirical realities of legally salient 
issues within and beyond the state required a theoretical framework that could 
reach across the entire landscape of problems purported to be susceptible to 
resolution or mitigation with the assistance of international hard and soft law. In 
addition, the diversity and dynamism of real-world issues demanded a framework 
that synchronically and diachronically embraces international, national, and local 
law, because normative development within these planes is inextricably 
intertwined in practice in ways that have grown over time. 
From a social science perspective, the TLO framework emerged initially with 
an awareness that specific hypotheses or highly abstract frames respectively 
provided no systematic way to compare, contrast, and learn from developments 
in areas of law involving social problems from which one could build conditional 
theory subject to empirical confirmation, refinement, or disconfirmation, 
including for purposes of problem-solving.13 We began with a high-level concept, 
“order,” and both processual (“ordering”) and institutional (“orders”) expressions 
of this concept, which could bring sociological and legal frames to encompass the 
bewildering diversity of social problems and their relation to law, regulation, and 
governance. Here we consciously displaced an exclusive focus on international law 
by situating international law within the frame of transnational legal ordering. We 
 
10  See, for example, studies on the question of whether international investment agreements induce 
greater flows of foreign direct investment, a topic raised both in Abebe et al., supra note 1, and 
Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 1. But see JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN 
& MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 155–79 
(2017). 
11   But see CARLO ROVELLI, SEVEN BRIEF LESSONS ON PHYSICS 23 (2014) (“Science begins with a vision. 
Scientific thought is fed by the capacity to ‘see’ things differently than they have previously been 
seen.”). 
12  TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015). 
13  Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 1 (discussing the importance of developing conditional theory in 
the study of international law). 
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brought old (“institutionalization”) and new (“recursivity”)14 social science 
concepts to channel empirical research across and within conventionally defined 
subject areas of law, which then could be compared for the purposes of broader 
theory development.15 We refined these further with the specification of 
inductively derived mechanisms that have been observed to drive cycles of legal 
change beyond the state until they reach a kind of moving equilibrium (or relative 
“settlement”) in what we characterize as a TLO. 
While we elaborate further elements of this framework for social science 
engagement with international law below, suffice it to say here that this phase of 
theory development owes more to a Weberian genre of social science research on 
law than to a particular genre of strict hypothesis testing in contexts where 
quantitative data are already available or can be constructed.16 It is a phase of 
inductive extrapolation and synthesis, of concept development and invention, of 
proposals for encompassing theory that may offer frames, then propositions, and 
press ultimately toward specific hypotheses that may be tested. In fact, in the first 
round of case studies using TLO theory, scores of hypotheses emerged, all 
susceptible to some form of historical, qualitative, or quantitative examination, 
that can be pursued in the refinement of such theory.17 Therefore, we contend 
that social science approaches importantly include framework construction, 
concept elaboration, as well as hypothesis generation and testing, involving both 
deductive and inductive reasoning. 
This expansive understanding of social science extends to methods.18 While 
we share with Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg an appreciation of multiple social 
 
14  Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National 
Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOCIO. 1135 (2007). 
15  For studies across different areas, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 12; 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (Gregory Shaffer ed., 2013). For studies 
within a particular area of law, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(Gregory Shaffer & Ely Aaronson eds., 2020); Tom Ginsburg, Terence C. Halliday & Gregory 
Shaffer, Constitution-Making as Transnational Legal Ordering, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 1 (Gregory Shaffer, Tom Ginsburg & Terence C. Halliday eds., 
2019); Seth Davis & Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Fiduciary Law, 5 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L, 
TRANSNAT’L & COMPL. L. 1 (2020) (introducing a symposium issue). For a study of the globalization 
of legal education that reflects and feeds into these processes, see BRYANT GARTH & GREGORY 
SHAFFER, THE GLOBALIZATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION: A CRITIQUE (forthcoming 2021). 
16  See MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils trans., 
Harvard University Press 1954) (1925). 
17  See Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 12, at 518–24. On the importance of emergent analytics involving 
“discovery,” see Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World 
Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 85, 119–21, 131, 136–37 (2009). 
18  There are debates within the social sciences regarding the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
deductive and inductive approaches, as well as whether social science can aspire to theory testing 
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science methods, we posit that the methodological norm in social science research 
embraces an array of qualitative methods as commonly as quantitative methods, 
which do not necessarily involve hypothesis testing, but also concept 
development, hypothesis formulation, and discovery. Systematic interviewing, 
participant observation, archival research, and systematic textual analysis, among 
others, are conventionally deployed in leading schools of the social sciences with 
the recognition that a privileging of a particular method leads less to a richer 
empirical understanding of issues than to a constriction of realms of empirical 
inquiry. But what is common to all these methods is that they form part of a larger 
process of social inquiry that includes some form of empirical verification, even if 
a problem, data set, or method cannot yield a hard quantitative result. 
In sum, where we have common ground with Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg 
is, first, in their call for empirical research that includes hypothesis testing. Second, 
we agree that such research should start with a social problem, not a mere 
intellectual one. We stress, however, that researchers should recognize that the 
very conception of social problems involves social constructions implicated by 
ideology, politics, and social positioning, reflecting a researcher’s background, 
interests, and proclivities.19 Just as Anthea Roberts noted how international law is 
not “international” in that different national traditions reflect and propagate 
different conceptions of international law,20 so the conceptualization of social 
problems and thus the variables that measure how effectively problems are 
addressed will reflect a researcher’s positioning. The very framing of an issue as a 
problem constitutes an intervention in the world to the extent that the researcher 
intends her research to be relevant and useful. 
III.  PERMEATING THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL BINARY FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF PRACTICE  
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg build upon a longstanding distinction 
between “internal” views of international law, which are characterized by 
descriptive, normative, and doctrinal analysis, and “external” approaches, which 
 
in the same way as the natural sciences. See, e.g., BENT FLYVBJERG, MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE 
MATTER (2001); IAN SHAPIRO, THE FLIGHT FROM REALITY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2005). In 
practice, inductive and deductive work always interact. Inductive probing leads to new hypotheses; 
and hypotheses inform inductive probing. As John Dewey stressed, researchers revise hypotheses 
through experience in response to the social problems they study. John Dewey, Logical Method and 
Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 24–26 (1924). 
19  Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Participant Objectivation, 9 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 281, 283 (2003) 
(“What needs to be objectivized [ ] is . . . the social world that has made both the anthropologist 
and the conscious or unconscious anthropology that she (or he) engages in her anthropological 
practice.”). 
20  See generally ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? (2017). 
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examine the law from the outside, how it came to be, and its consequences.21 Our 
research indicates that it may be time to loosen this distinction from the 
perspective of actual practice. To start, breaking down this binary will 
constructively expand the contributions that social science can make to internal as 
well as external legal questions. In addition, from a pragmatist perspective of social 
science and social action, both internal and external approaches have more in 
common than indicated by a strict separation. In particular, both operate within 
particular social contexts, and both conceptualize and aim to address perceptions 
of particular social problems. 
On the one hand, for too long sociologists and other social scientists treated 
the internal processes of lawmaking, and, even more, the very substance and form 
of international law itself, as a black box—a region of activity colonized by lawyers 
and left to their exclusive epistemological claims. This separation of study suited 
the lawyers because it erected a fence around their mostly invisible doings. Our 
work, in part, aims to show how the social scientist can constructively open up 
this black box and reveal how doctrinal development can be leveraged as instances 
of behavior subject to social science inquiry. 
Extending a line of scholarship on the rhetorical properties of global legal 
norms and scripts,22 Block-Lieb and Halliday show that the varieties of law 
produced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL)—legislative guides, model laws, treaties—comprise a repertoire of 
rule-types, embedded in other rhetorical contexts such as preambles and 
glossaries.23 These texts reflect, on the one side, an adaptation to the political 
challenge of finding global consensus on legal norms, and, on the other side, a 
prospective anticipation of what institutions (courts, executive agencies, 
legislatures) in nation-states could accept as international normative guidance to 
bring national law into concordance with such global norms. 24 
This work illustrates how a mere description of either the substantive or 
doctrinal elements of international hard and soft law fails to capture the fullness 
 
21  Taking from H.L.A. Hart, Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg define “an ‘internal’ view of international 
law,” as “an approach that, whether descriptive or normative, is at its core a doctrinal exercise—as 
opposed to an ‘external’ view of international law—that is an approach that examines the law from 
outside, seeking how it came to be or what its consequences might be in the real world.” Abebe et 
al., supra note 1, at 5. 
22  See SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS 227 (2017); Terence C. Halliday, Susan 
Block-Lieb & Bruce G. Carruthers, Rhetorical Legitimation: Global Scripts as Strategic Devices of 
International Organizations, 8 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 77 (2010); Alexander E. Kentikelenis & Leonard 
Seabrooke, The Politics of World Polity: Script-writing in International Organizations, 82 AM. SOCIO. REV. 
1065 (2017). 
23  See generally BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 22. 
24  See TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND 
SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009). 
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of ideological, political, and problem-solving work internalized in the very formal 
character of the law itself, whether looking back on where the law came from or 
looking forward to where the law is directed. When the substantive provisions of 
these laws are matched with the normative and material interests of lawmakers 
and the ecological dynamics of lawmaking processes, the normativity of law opens 
up more fully to social scientific exploration. In a pragmatic logic almost as strong 
as the “should” in normative approaches to law, a close examination of 
international law’s doctrinal content and form can be posed by the social scientist 
as a contingent proposition: if actors want a given outcome (as a normative ideal 
or pragmatic aim), what will be the substantive and formal properties of the law 
most likely to bring it about? This task is firmly within the epistemological 
mandate of both the social sciences and internal participants in legal processes. In 
other words, “internal” actors developing, interpreting, and critiquing 
international hard and soft law texts are highly interested in so-called “external” 
questions. Additionally, empirical research can be valuable for understanding and 
adapting the doctrine to dynamic changes in the world with which law interacts. 
Similarly, through systematic interviewing, Shaffer found that internal actors 
are equally interested in understanding the processes that he studies, as they were 
“themselves engaged in quasi-social scientific ‘studies’ of the same processes.”25 
They too wished to understand and respond to legal processes and the issues that 
they address. They too aimed to “make sense” of developments in the trade law 
world that he studied, as they must respond to a continuously unfolding present 
on partial information in real time. They were interested in his work for the 
insights it might provide for the tasks before them.26 Internal work, from this 
perspective, involves more than doctrine, but includes the relation of doctrine to 
concrete areas of legal practice. 27 
As legal realists have long stressed, internal and external approaches often 
mesh in practice.28 Within the concept of internal approaches, we include both 
 
25  Shaffer, supra note 9, at xiv (quoting Douglas R. Holmes & George E. Marcus, Para-Ethnography, in 
2 THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS 595 (Lisa M. Given ed., 2008)) 
(“By treating our subjects as collaborators, as epistemic partners, our analytical interests and theirs 
can be pursued simultaneously, and we can share insights and thus develop a common analytical 
exchange.”). 
26  Stewart Macaulay earlier documented the dilemma lawyers found in developing, applying, or 
ignoring contract law in the U.S. domestic context in relation to business goals. Stewart Macaulay, 
Non-Contractual Relations and Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOCIO. REV. 55 (1963). 
27  BRIAN TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY 194 (1995) (“The notion of practice is an 
essential concept for a realistic approach because it joins behavior (activity) with interpretation (the 
meaning which informs the activity).”). Tamanaha nonetheless conceived of an internal/external 
divide in terms of the observer (participant or non-participant) and the observed (internal or 
external view of the practice). Id. at 177. 
28  See Gregory Shaffer, The Legal Realist Approach to International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND FRONTIERS (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack eds., forthcoming 2021). 
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positivist doctrinal approaches and the internal work of instrumental actors that 
draft and interpret legal texts.29 Instrumental actors, by definition, aim to define, 
interpret, and shape legal norms in light of their conception of a problem, and 
thus are concerned with assessing the empirical implications of norm formulation 
and norm application. Doctrinal internal approaches may purport not to be 
instrumental, but even so, they vary in the extent to which they expressly or 
implicitly take context into account. Legal positivists such as H.L.A. Hart address 
the social meaning of texts which implicitly reflects context.30 Even Ronald 
Dworkin can be viewed, in part, as adopting a Weberian concept of verstehen (or 
understanding) when he characterizes an “internal point of view” as that of those 
engaged in legal argumentation—that is, those participants engaged in the 
“constructive interpretation” of law’s meaning.31 In a related Weberian vein, 
sociologist Roger Cotterrell contends that “in order to understand law, the legal 
sociologist has to understand it as a participant, or as a participant does, or rather 
as many different kinds of participants do—lawyers or citizens, for example, living 
in the world of law.”32 We would not go so far as to say “must,” as the stance 
depends on the empirical question asked, and whether one adopts a Weberian-
interpretivist or Durkheimian-positivist position on social science. As argued in 
Section II, we call for a broad tent in conceptualizing social science approaches to 
law. Nonetheless, many social science studies of law would benefit from a closer 
understanding of the legal process. 
Those adopting an internal approach participate in a social process in which 
they aim to contribute to the understanding and elaboration of legal norms. They 
help define, explicate, elaborate, and otherwise shape the meaning of legal norms 
as applied to different contexts. They do so at the international level, whether 
through the presentation of legal briefs and arguments before international 
tribunals and the rendering of decisions by these tribunals, or at other stages in 
the legal process, whether through treaty drafting, the development of non-
 
29  Charles Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in Legal Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 
1203, 1209–10 (2015) (noting that Hart also characterized the distinction as between genuine versus 
instrumental rule followers). 
30  See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW vii, 113 (1961) (explaining that one of the two 
“minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system” is that “its rules 
of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must 
be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behavior by its officials” and 
characterizing this work as “descriptive sociology”). 
31  Compare RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 13, 52–53 (1986) (discussing constructive 
interpretation involving justification and fit), with MAX WEBER, SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION 18–
19 (W.G. Runciman ed., Eric Matthews trans., 1978), and MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 88 (Talcott Parsons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons 
trans., 1964) (defining verstehen). Similarly, the philosopher John Rawls stresses the role of “reflective 
equilibrium” in theorizing. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 (1971). 
32  ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW’S COMMUNITY 369–70 (1996).  
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binding model agreements and guides for national legislators, the formulation of 
indicators to measure national and business compliance with legal norms, or the 
drafting of studies (such as by the U.N. International Law Commission presented 
to the U.N. General Assembly or by U.N. Special Rapporteurs presented to the 
U.N. Human Rights Council). Other bodies reference these texts at the 
international, national, and local levels (including domestic courts), further 
conveying, embedding, and reshaping legal norms as part of a transnational 
process. Scholarly doctrinal analysis, in turn, aims to further critique, refine, and 
otherwise influence such normative development. 
Legal realists, working in the pragmatist tradition, contend that all norms are 
developed in social and political contexts and they must be subject to constant 
evaluation based on experience, which drives norm development.33 Hanoch 
Dagan, for example, conceptualizes the legal realist understanding of law in terms 
of the constitutive tensions between internal and external factors, namely those of 
reason and power, legal craft and empirics, and tradition and progress.34 Legal 
realists combine empirical analysis of law with internal decision making and 
critique in light of the social context to which law is applied.35 Empirical work can 
be ignored, diagnostics can be based on plausible folk theories,36 and law can be 
 
33  Those working in a legal realist tradition, from Holmes, Cardozo, and Llewellyn, to contemporary 
legal scholars, focus on the application of texts to social facts. Compare Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) (establishing the bad man theory of law), with BENJAMIN 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921) (contending law is subject to an 
“endless process of testing and retesting”), KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: 
DECIDING APPEALS 60 (1960) (studying law “as it works”), and Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 17 (on 
the importance of conditional theory and emergent analytics in relation to social facts). 
34  Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607 (2007). Relatedly, Brian 
Tamanaha shows how legal realists have been mislabeled as radical skeptics of law, whereas, 
although they were critical of legal doctrine not adapted to social context, they believed that law 
can serve as an “instrument” to advance “the social good,” and they “fervently labored to improve 
it.” BRIAN TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN 
JUDGING 93–94 (2010). 
35  In this vein, the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey stressed the importance of combining internal 
principles and external analysis in legal decision making, writing: 
For the purposes of a logic of inquiry into probable consequences, general 
principles can only be tools justified by the work they do. They are means of 
intellectual survey, analysis, and insight into the factors of the situation to be 
dealt with. Like other tools they must be modified when they are applied to new 
conditions and new results have to be achieved. Failure to recognize that general 
legal rules and principles are working hypotheses, needing to be constantly 
tested by the way in which they work out in application to concrete situations, 
explains the otherwise paradoxical fact that the slogans of the liberalism of one 
period often become the bulwarks of reaction in a subsequent era. 
 Dewey, supra note 18, at 26. 
36  Terence C. Halliday, Plausible Folk Theories: Throwing Veils of Plausibility over Zones of Ignorance in Global 
Governance, 69 BRIT. J. SOCIO. 936 (2018). 
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simply expressive and symbolic,37 which is why empirics are important. 
Nonetheless, when actors aim to develop norms to shape behavior, they benefit 
from empirics. A realistic conception of law is not either/or (internal reason or 
external agency and structure), but both at once. Such an approach is particularly 
important for the development of processual theorizing and pragmatic problem-
solving in which social contexts change. 
Most importantly, the danger of insisting on too tight of a dichotomy for 
both doctrinal and empirical scholarship is that it cuts off inquiry, rather than 
opening up new spaces for investigation and critique. As Charles Barzun writes, 
the internal/external distinction 
rarely serves as a useful conceptual tool to clarify issues or open up avenues 
of inquiry. Instead, it operates mainly as a rhetorical weapon whose function 
is to insulate particular substantive views from arguments deemed to be 
threatening to it. Its tendency has thus been to cabin scholarly debate about 
the nature and purposes of law, rather than to widen it, and to dampen 
original thinking about such questions, rather than to stimulate or 
provoke it.38 
By loosening the distinction, more legal issues become relevant for empirical 
inquiry, and better understanding of legal practice will inform more nuanced 
empirical analysis. 
IV.  RESEARCHING TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS AND 
ORDERING  
The framework of studying norm development and change through 
transnational legal ordering processes illustrates the rich possibilities open to 
empirically oriented scholars. Traditionally, international law focused 
predominantly on interstate relations—“the law of nations”—such as regards 
territorial sovereignty, the treatment of foreign nationals’ person and property, 
and war and peace.39 Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s essay, though grounded in 
our time, still tends to focus on traditional international law between nation-states. 
Over time, however, the scope of international law expanded to cover most 
substantive areas of law, from human rights and criminal law to regulatory law 
and business transactions. In parallel, the scale of international norm-making 
swelled, as actors aimed to use international hard and soft law and processes to 
 
37  MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964). 
38  Barzun, supra note 29, at 1209–10; see also Pierre Schlag, Normativity and Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 801, 920 (1991) (“[T]he rhetorical conventionality of the inside/outside distinction and its 
derivative, the internal/external perspective, have enabled controversial matters to be assumed into 
and out of existence without being questioned.”). 
39  Read, for example, the table of contents of 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, 
PEACE (1905) and 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 
(1906). 
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reach deep into state law and institutions.40 Today, international law is an 
instrument for social ordering that involves much more than relations among 
states, as international law now addresses most areas of social life. The expanded 
scope and scale of international law—its breadth and depth—opens a vast array 
of subject areas for empirical study. 
To study these developments, we created a theoretical framework that places 
international law in a broader transnational perspective, one that builds from 
empirical work and, in turn, develops hypotheses for further empirical 
investigation. In this work we develop a framework for the study of the 
transnational development of legal norms in which international law plays a role. 
By transnational legal ordering, we refer to the processes through which legal 
norms are framed, propagated, settled, institutionalized, contested, and changed 
transnationally. These processes can give rise to what we call a TLO—a collection 
of legal norms and associated organizations and actors that shape the understanding 
and practice of law across national jurisdictions in a particular field.41 These norms 
are not static, but dynamically and recursively change within a transnational 
context in which norm making and practice at the international, national, and local 
levels interact. In a series of books and articles, we have applied this framework 
with others to a broad array of issue areas, ranging from regulatory and private 
law to constitutional and human rights law. 42 
The TLO framework, with its emphasis on legal orders and ordering, brings 
an integrated sociolegal vocabulary and method to international law thoroughly 
grounded in social science. Researchers begin by identifying how agents of legal 
change frame a problem to be mitigated by law, a characteristic method of 
sociologists and anthropologists. If a settled TLO is the goal of policy 
entrepreneurs, researchers must discover which longer-term facilitating 
circumstances and shorter-term precipitating conditions thrust an issue onto 
policy agendas beyond nation-states. Through different empirical research 
methods, law and social science scholars observe how actors mobilize to address 
economic, social, political, and other problems through means that entail 
international law. Research will reveal which combinations of substate, state, and 
supra-state actors, together with non-state, civil society and market actors, engage 
each other in a bid to produce legal responses. Reflecting normative and material 
interests, actors at different levels of social action—local, national, and 
 
40  Gregory Shaffer & Carlos Coye, From International Law to Jessup’s Transnational Law, from Transnational 
Law to Transnational Legal Orders, in THE MANY LIVES OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL 
ENGAGEMENTS WITH JESSUP’S BOLD PROPOSAL 126 (Peer Zumbansen ed., 2020). 
41  TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 12, at 5 (defining a TLO as “a collection of formalized 
legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding 
and practice of law across national jurisdictions”). 
42  See supra note 15. 
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international—engage in transnational legal-ordering processes often through a 
mix of cooperation, competition, and conflict. 43 
An empirically grounded conditional theory will assess the circumstances in 
which an institutionalized TLO emerges. A TLO consists of more than a codified 
body of international law; it exhibits perceptible concordance of legal norms 
across transnational, national, and local levels of lawmaking and practice. Such 
legal ordering is constantly in motion. Legal change within a state or by a state can 
impel change in international law, just as change in international law can influence 
law reform by states and local institutions. Empirical research will reveal the 
degree to which relatively settled law results both formally and in practice, so that 
the law is predictable for practitioners and regulatory subjects. 
We derive from TLO research on business and finance, human rights, and 
regulation in international law an extensive array of hypotheses which serve at 
least two purposes.44 One is to underline the contingencies of TLOs: the 
conditions under which they rise and decline, and cooperate and compete; the 
circumstances in which they are propagated and resisted, and adapted and 
rejected; and the varieties of forms they can take in different issue-areas and in 
their temporal and geographical manifestations. Another is to display the 
extensive breadth of empirical inquiries, accompanied by the full panoply of social 
science methods, that open up for social scientists and legal scholars in mutually 
respectful partnership. TLO theory brings social science disciplines into 
conversation with law, and concomitantly brings scholars studying domestic legal 
change into engagement with counterparts studying international and 
transnational legal change. 
V.  EXEMPLIFYING SOCIAL SCIENCE SCHOLARSHIP ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WITHIN A TLO  FRAMEWORK 
We now briefly summarize two research projects that illustrate the empirical 
study of transnational legal ordering and the settlement and unsettlement of 
TLOs. 
 
43  Compare Gregory Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and 
Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010) and TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERS, supra note 12 (discussing different forms of cooperative, competitive, and antagonistic 
alignment of legal-ordering processes), with BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 23 (highlighting 
cooperation, competition, competitive cooperation, and conflict). 
44  See, e.g., Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 12, at 475, 518–24. 
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A.  Illustration One: International Trade Law as “Public Law” 
and Practice 
Gregory Shaffer’s forthcoming book, Emerging Powers and the World Trading 
System, exemplifies how international trade law developed through recursive 
interaction between domestic and international law and practice.45 On the one 
hand, the United States had the greatest impact in shaping WTO norms. Many of 
its norms came out of U.S. law and practice, ranging from intellectual property 
and import relief law to the timelines for WTO dispute settlement and the 
organizing principles for WTO negotiations. Other countries, such as Brazil, 
India, and China (which are the three case studies covered in the book) adapted 
their laws, institutions, and professions in light of WTO norms. When they 
became adept at international trade law, they successfully challenged U.S. practices 
and resisted U.S. pressure on them, which helped catalyze U.S. disenchantment 
with the liberal economic order that it had been central in creating. Shaffer’s 
empirical study started with a problem—the role of trade law capacity in shaping 
norms and affecting outcomes. The work included a quantitative study based on 
an original survey, and systematic interviewing and participant observation over 
time.46 It traced the contribution of legal capacity to the settlement and 
unsettlement of national and international trade law norms and practices within 
and across these major countries, implicating the broader international trading 
system. 
B.  Illustration Two: International Trade Law as “Private Law” 
and Practice 
In Global Lawmaking, Block-Lieb and Halliday show how a social science 
approach to lawmaking by UNCITRAL, one of the leading international 
organizations that creates international private law, affirms and extends the call by 
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg for applying social science to the study of 
international law, while exemplifying the potential of alliances between social 
science and legal scholars.47 They begin with three transnational problems, which 
are framed by ecologies of actors: to save failing businesses, especially those whose 
assets and liabilities cross borders; to free up capital for investment in transitional 
and developing economies; and to forestall the emergence of regional blocs that 
 
45  SHAFFER, supra note 9. 
46  Id. The work illustrates the benefits of partnering with those in other disciplines (such as political 
science) and those embedded in other national settings (such as in Brazil, China, and India). The 
book’s case studies were written with Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin (Brazil), Henry Gao (China), 
and James Nedumpara and Aseema Sinha (India). The underlying survey and its analysis were 
conducted with political scientists Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt. 
47  BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 23. 
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govern transport of goods through international waters. They demonstrate 
empirically that close attention to the process of developing transnational legal 
orders in three areas of commercial law to address these problems—corporate 
bankruptcy, secured transactions, and carriage of goods by sea—shows that the 
distinction between the “external” and “internal” substantially dissolves. 
Quantitative measurement of delegations’ participation in lawmaking and 
rhetorical analysis and counts of substantive rule-types demonstrate ways that the 
external penetrates almost entirely inside the internal such that codified doctrine 
both reflects and anticipates the economic and social and political contexts in 
which it orders behavior through legal norms. The study exemplifies the necessity 
of triangulating methods: archival research, participant observation, interviews, 
textual analysis, and coding and quantitative analysis of official records and official 
proceedings. In so doing, it responds less to a specific hypothesis, nor is it intent 
on presenting new hypotheses readily tested by quantitative methods. Rather, it 
endeavors to amplify the power of the TLO framework, expanding and refining 
its theoretical elements, and presents findings about efforts to institutionalize new 
legal orders that approach the pragmatics of innovative global governance. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
In sum, we contend that law should no longer be studied in a 
methodologically nationalist perspective involving a sharp dichotomy of 
international and national norm development and practice, as reflected in 
predominant internal and external scholarly approaches. The national and 
international development of legal norms and practices transnationally intertwine 
and beckon for empirical study. The process of creating and elaborating the TLO 
framework itself demonstrates the richness of possible social science engagement 
with international law, including internal approaches to international law. It 
emerged as a way to bring some theoretical coherence to an enormously 
heterogeneous body of international law scholarship on a diverse array of issues 
framed as problems to be addressed through law. It involved the creation of new 
concepts—transnational legal ordering, transnational legal orders—and the 
incorporation of other concepts (recursivity, concordance, settling, alignment) 
into an integrated framework. That in turn has been creatively and critically 
applied by social scientists and international law specialists to business and 
finance, health and medicine, human rights, climate change, international crime, 
and fiduciary relationships. From these applications, scholars have generated 
scores of hypotheses and propositions on framing, rising and falling, propagating 
and resisting, and institutionalizing and structuring TLOs. The “testing” of these 
hypotheses has often not been possible by quantitative methods. More often the 
theory has been advanced by historical and qualitative social science empirical 
research. In this respect the TLO framework holds the promise of substantially 
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enhancing social science engagement with international law with the prospect of 
mutual enrichment. In so doing, it amplifies the spirit—and widens the scope—
of Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s call for scholarship on international law 
enriched by social sciences. 
